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Abstract

This paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest
depends only on the size of the bequest. It exploits the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a
reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the altruism parameter
and the value of the joy of giving parameter. Using previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible values
for the altruism parameter we then derive plausible restrictions on the joy of giving parameter. We
demonstrate that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude larger than assumed in the existing
literature.
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SPECIFICATION OF THE JOY OF GIVING: INSIGHTS FROM ALTRUISM

Andrew B. Abel and Mark Warshawsky*
Abstract-This paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive
in which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest depends
only on the size of the bequest. It exploits the fact that this
formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the
altruism parameter and the value of the joy of giving parameter. Using previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible
values for the altruism parameter we then derive plausible
restrictions on the joy of giving parameter. We demonstrate
that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude larger
than assumed in the existing literature.

have used the joy of giving model, either in the belief
that it captures the true reason for bequests, or more
likely, because it is a tractable "reduced form" representation of altruistic preferences. This model has been

used by Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973),
and Richard (1975) to examine the joint demand for life
insurance and risky assets; Blinder (1974) included ajoy

of giving bequest motive among the mechanisms creating inequality in the distribution of income and wealth;

Seidman (1983) analyzed consumption, inheritance,
wage and capital income taxes in a life cycle growth
Bequest motives by individual consumers have im-

model extended to include joy of giving bequests; and

portant implications for the behavior of financial

Hubbard (1984), Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) and

markets, the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policies

Abel (1986) discussed the implications of imperfections

and the intergenerational transmission of inequality in

in private and public annuity markets for savings be-

the distribution of wealth. At least four reasons for the

havior and capital accumulation in a joy of giving

existence of bequests have been discussed in the litera-

framework.

ture: (1) bequests may be the unintentional by-product

In most applications of altruism and joy of giving, the

of precautionary savings and a stochastic date of death

bequest motive is parameterized by a small number of

in the absence of an annuity market (Abel (1985)); (2)

parameters. Economic theory provides substantial guid-

the prospect of bequests is used by parents to induce

ance on the admissible, or at least plausible, values of

children to behave as desired by the parents (Bemheim,

the parameters in the simple formulations of the al-

Shleifer, and Summers (1985)); (3) bequests may arise

truism model and these implications have been dis-

from intergenerational altruism, that is, consumers ob-

cussed by Drazen (1978) and Weil (1987). However,
there has evidently been no systematic discussion of the

tain utility from their heirs' utility as well as from their
own consumption (Barro (1974)); and (4) bequests may

range of appropriate parameter values for simple formu-

arise from the "joy of giving," that is, consumers leave

lations of the joy of giving model, despite the popularity

bequests simply because they obtain utility directly

of this formulation in simulation work. Indeed, in discussing the appropriate value of the joy of giving
parameter, Blinder (1974) states that "there is little

from the bequest (Yaari (1964)).

For some theoretical and empirical analyses of the
issues affected by voluntary intergenerational transfers,
the reason for the bequest motive is critical. For example, the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem

intuition that can be brought to bear here" (p. 95).

This paper explores the implications of economic
theory for the appropriate range of parameter values for

and the implied inefficacy of fiscal policy depends cru-

a popular specification of the joy of giving motive. Our

cially on an altruistic motive rather than a joy of giving

strategy is to assume that the bequest is actually moti-

motive. For many other purposes, however, the reason

vated by altruism and then to express the parameter of

for the bequest motive is not crucial. Many economists

a joy of giving bequest motive in terms of the altruism

parameter. A striking result of this analysis is that the
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joy of giving parameter could be orders of magnitude
larger than the values that appear in the simulation

literature (Fischer (1973), Blinder (1974), Seidman
(1983), Hubbard (1984)). A related finding is that the
apparently large joy of giving parameters found by
Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) correspond to a quite
modest degree of altruism.
I. A Model of Individual Behavior

Consider a family in which each consumer lives for L
periods and in which N periods elapse between the

birth of successive generations. Suppose that each con-

146 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
sumer has one child and that bequests from parent to

child are made at the beginning of the child's life. Let

IP be the inheritance received by a generation j con-

If all generations in an infinitely-lived altruistic family
have the same utility function, then the utility of the
generation j consumer is a function of the total wealth

sumer at the beginning of his life, let Y' be the present

at birth V' = V(Wi). Hence equation (5) may be writ-

value of labor income of the generation j consumer and

ten as

let c/, i = 1,..., L be the consumption of a generation

j consumer when he is age i. Letting R be the (gross)

V(W') = max{ E i1lu(cj) + ,8NaV(Wj?l)}

rate of return on wealth, the lifetime budget constraint

(6)

is
L

Yj + IP - L R-('-')cl + R-NIJ+l. (1)
i=l

It will be convenient to define HJ as the present value

of the human wealth of the generation j consumer and
all of his descendents
00

HJ = E (R-N)kyJ+k. (2)
k=O

Next, let WJ denote the total wealth, human plus

non-human, as of the beginning of the generation j
consumer's life,

WJ

=

IX

+

H.

Recalling that W"+' = B' + Hi+ 1, equation (6) has the
appearance of a "joy of giving" bequest motive. Strictly
speaking, it is not a joy of giving bequest motive because the function V( ) cannot be specified indepen-

dently; it is the solution to a functional equation. Below
we solve this functional equation and express the
parameter of the joy of giving specification in terms of
the altruism parameter a..4
We begin by characterizing the solution to the maximization problem on the right-hand side of (6). The
first-order conditions are

u'(c') = (Rf8)'1u'(c/), i = 2,..., L (7a)

(3)

u'(c') = (R1) NaV,(WWj?) - (R18)Nau,(cj?l)

Finally, let BJ denote the bequest left by a generation

(7b)

j consumer and observe that IJ+1 = B1. Therefore,
equation (3) implies that

Wi+- = B' + Hi+'. (4)
Suppose that the utility function is time-separable

and displays altruism. Let V' denote the utility of the

where the second equality in (7b) follows from the
envelope theorem. A steady state is characterized by

cJ = c/+, i= 1,.. ., L and W' = WJ+1. It follows
from (7b) that a(Rf8)N = 1 in the steady state.

generation j consumer and suppose that

II. The Implied Weight of the Joy of Giving
Bequest Motive

VJ = max{ZEf8l1u(cJ) + fNaVj?1} (5)
where u' > 0, u" < 0, ,B captures time preference (O <

,8 < 1) and a > 0 indicates the strength of the bequest

In this section we present the function Vi = V(W')
under the assumption that u(c) has the isoelastic form

motive. The maximization in (5) is subject to (1) and to

u(c)= 1 -a[c > ];a0. (8)

the solvency condition limj , 0 R- N] WJ ? 0.
In order for the maximand in (5) to be finite, the

weight on the heir's utility, 8Na, must lie between 0 and

It can be verified that under isoelastic utility, the solu-

tion to the functional equation in (6) is5

1. This restriction does not require a to be less than or

equal to 1. To help interpret the value of a, we will

V(

define the term "full altruism" to mean that in every

period in which both the generation j consumer and the

W)

*1-a

(9a)

where

generation j + 1 consumer are alive, the optimal allo-

= { F/[1 - RN (aJNRN)/] } (9b)

cation of family consumption is for the parent and child

to have equal consumption (ck?i - CJ/', i = 1,...,
L - N).1 Under the utility function in (5), full altruism

corresponds to a = 1.2,3

1 Meade (1968) defined a similar concept called "perfect

and
L

r _ E [R(1/a)1131/a]1']. (9c)
i=l

altruism."

2 For more general specifications of the utility from one's
own consumption, there may not exist any value of a for
which the utility function displays full altruism.

3 To verify that full altruism corresponds to a = 1, observe

that for i = 1.., L - N, u'(ck+i) = (Rf)-(N+-1l)uU(cC) =

( R)- (' -)au'(ci+1) = au'(cJ+1) where the first and third

equalities follow from (7a) and the second equality follows

from (7b) below. Therefore, ck__ = c+ 1 if and only if a = 1.
4 Blinder (1974, pp. 37-39) also calculates the value of the
joy of giving parameter implied by altruism but this calculation
is restricted to the case of full altruism (a = 1).

5 See Abel and Warshawsky (1987) for details.
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TABLE 1.-IMPLIED WEIGHTS ON JOY OF GIVING FUNCTION AND
ASSUMED DEGREE OF ALTRUISM

B3-1 _1 R a (a = 0.5) (a = 1) (a = 2) (a=4)
0.04 1.06 0.56 1.14 4.96 100.99 43,076
0.04 1.04 1.00 1.80 10.49 356.76 412,807
0.02 1.06 0.32 2.01 7.47 142.29 58,940
0.02 1.04 0.56 2.86 15.80 524.71 600,161
0.02 1.02 1.00 4.91 43.70 3,459.06 21,673,136
0.01 1.06 0.23 2.91 9.57 172.13 69,611
0.01 1.04 0.42 3.93 20.24 649.94 732,042
0.01 1.02 0.74 6.38 55.96 4,398.76 27,466,003
0.01 1.01 1.00 9.84 130.53 22,964.63 710,820,614
Source: Calculations based on equation (11) with N = 30, L = 60.

Using equations (4) and (9a, b, c) we rewrite the utility
function in (6) as

1 (it was between 0.42 and 1.20).6 The first row of table
1 indicates that for a = 0.5 a value of X around 1 is

consistent with a = 0.56 but for a = 2, a value of X
around 100 is required to be consistent with a = 0.56 in

/L

V(W') = {ZEll-1(CJ)

the steady state.

III. Estimates of Altruism

+ X(B' + HJ+1)1a} (1-a)
(10a)

where

X = R-N{J[( ,8NRN) - R -N]. (lOb)
Equation (10a) expresses the utility of the generation
j consumer as a function of his own consumption cJ,
i= 1,..., L and the bequest he makes, B'. This equation is equivalent to a joy of giving formulation. Treating the exogenous human wealth term H ?+1 as a
parameter, the joy of giving function is a member of the
HARA class of utility functions. In the absence of
human wealth (HJ 0), this function has the frequently-used isoelastic form.
We have defined X so that, in the absence of human

Table 1 shows the implied joy of giving parameter
consistent with a given degree of altruism. We can also
address the inverse question: given a time preference
discount factor fi, a gross rate of return R and a joy of
giving parameter X, what is the implied value of the
altruism parameter a? In this section we provide a
general solution to this question. Then we apply this
solution to calculate the values of the altruism parameter implied by the values of the joy of giving parameter
estimated by Friedman and Warshawsky (1985).
We begin by observing that in terms of consumer
behavior, it is marginal utility rather than the utility per

se which is important. In the altruistic formulation in
(10a) the marginal utility of leaving a bequest is
a

Fischer (1973). In the steady state, a(R13)N = 1, so that
(lOb) implies

X = R-f{ /[1 - RN]} in the steady state.
(11)

Table 1 presents the values of X and a corresponding
to various rates of time preference and steady state
interest rates. The last four columns of each row reveal
that X is an increasing function of the coefficient of
relative risk aversion a. Even when a is as low as 2, the
value of X can be orders of magnitude larger than the
values assumed by previous authors. For example, in
four sets of his simulations, Fischer (1973) used a rate
of time preference of 0.04 (actually ,B = 0.96), a net
interest rate of 0.06, and a coefficient of relative risk
aversion of 2.0. Although he used a time-varying weight
on the bequest motive, this weight was roughly equal to

v'

-d = X(BJ + H'+1)0. (12)

capital, it is comparable to the bequest weight b, in

Using (4) and the fact that BJ = P1+1, we may rewrite
(12) as

av'

(BJ)

(

(13)

Now consider a joy of giving bequest motive. Under
the commonly used isoelastic form X*(BJ)l - f/(1 - a),
the marginal utility of a bequest is
a Vi

dB_

=

X*(Bi)0

(14)

where X* is the weight on the bequest motive. In order
6 Blinder (1974), Seidman (1983) and Hubbard (1984) assumed similarly small values for the joy of giving parameter in
their simulations.
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to calibrate X* so that the calculated marginal utility in

TABLE 2.-ESTIMATES OF BEQUEST MOTIVE PARAMETER X*,

(14) would equal the marginal utility in (13), we equate

FROM FRIEDMAN AND WARSHAWSKY (1985)

the right-hand sides of (13) and (14) to obtain

S=0.4

S=0.5

S=0.6

R = 1.01

A WJ+1
= R-((Ii+?/WJ+?)F
- R-N]} (15)

The second equality in (15) follows from (lOb). The

a=
2
18
9
4
a=
3
169
58
18
a= 4 1488 343 74
R = 1.04
a=
2
10
5
3
a=
3
66
24
7
a= 4 419 105 22

adjustment factor (Ij+l/WJ+l)a in (15) depends on

IMPLIED VALUES OF ALTRUISM PARAMETER a

the bequest BJ. However, since the goal of this adjust-

ment is merely to choose an appropriate magnitude for

I/W= 0.6 I/W= 0.5 I/W= 0.4

X* in empirical and simulation work, some proxies for

IJ+ IWJ+l may be used such as the population average ratio of inheritances to total wealth, or a particular
family's historical average value of this ratio. Note that
in the presence of human wealth, IJ+1 < WJ + 1 so that
X* < X where X is given by (lOb). Equivalently, the
altruism parameter a corresponding to a particular value
of X* is larger than the a corresponding to the same
value of X in the model without human wealth. We can,
using (15), calculate the value of a corresponding to a

R = 1.01
a = 2 0.026 0.019 0.014
a= 3 0.007 0.005 0.003
a= 4 0.002 0.001 0.001
R = 1.04
a = 2 0.031 0.023 0.022
a= 3 0.013 0.009 0.005
a

=

4

0.005

0.003

0.002

Source: Top Panel-Friedman and Warshawsky (1985), table 9; /3=
(1.01)- 1.

Bottom Panel-Equation (16) with /? = (1.01)-', N = 30, L = 60,
X* from Top Panel with I/W = 1 - S.

given value of X* as
a = (fiR) N{R-N

tangible asset. For the ratio of tangible property wealth

to total wealth, IIW, we use 1 - S, where S is the

+ ( Ij+llWj+')(R RNxb*)a }
(16)

share of Social Security and pension wealth in total
wealth reported in the top panel of table 2. Finally, the

Equation (16) can be used to interpret the joy

values of X* are taken from the top panel of table 2.
The picture which emerges from the bottom panel of

of giving parameters estimated by Friedman and
Warshawsky (1985). Using empirically observed annuity
prices and a life cycle model of saving and portfolio
behavior, they concluded that an intentional bequest
motive must be present in order to explain the observed

small degree of participation in annuity markets. They
also derived the minimum values for the joy of giving

table 2 is quite different from that in the top panel. In
all cases the degree of the implied altruism parameter is
quite small.7 Thus, a weak altruistic bequest motive will
be sufficient to eliminate the purchase of private annuities.

IV. Conclusions

parameter that would eliminate purchases of individual

pensions in the average retired individual's portfolio, S,

This note analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in
which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest depends only on the size of the bequest. It exploits the

the degree of risk aversion and the degree to which
annuity prices exceed the actuarially fair prices. Their
results, which are reproduced in the top panel of table

fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a
relation between the value of the altruism parameter

2, might explain the failure of most consumers to buy

and the value of the joy of giving parameter. We demonstrate that the joy of giving parameter may well be
orders of magnitude larger than assumed in the existing

annuities under various assumptions about the gross

interest rate, R, the proportion of Social Security and

annuities as the consequence of apparently strong bequest motives.
An alternative measure of the strength of the bequest
motive is the implied value of the altruism parameter a.

The bottom panel of table 2 reports the calculated

values of a using (16) with N = 30, L = 60, f8 =
(1.01)-1 and R = 1.01 and 1.04. Since Social Security
income is not bequeathable, Social Security wealth is

appropriately treated as human wealth rather than as a

7In assessing these small values of a it must be kept in mind
that the Friedman and Warshawsky calculations produced a
lower bound on the strength of the bequest motive. Additionally, the present value of human wealth of future generations
has been ignored. The bequest motives may, therefore, be
substantially larger than the implied lower bounds presented in
table 2.

NOTES
literature. In addition, existing large empirical estimates
of the joy of giving parameter are shown to be consistent with a weak altruistic bequest motive.
Despite its analytic tractability, there has been some

reluctance to use the joy of giving formulation even in
analyses where only a generic bequest motive is neces-

sary. This reluctance may owe to the difficulty of making reasonable assumptions about, and in empirical
work and simulation models reasonable interpretations

of, the joy of giving parameter. In removing this difficulty, this paper takes an important step in interpret-

ing empirical work and simulation results that are directed at understanding actual economic phenomena
related to bequests.
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NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS IN PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION:
AN APPLICATION TO TRANSLOG DEMAND SYSTEMS

Scott W. Bamhart and Gerald A. Whitney*
Abstract-We examine whether the use of nonparametric analysis can provide information that improves the performance of
the translog utility function. We evaluate the performance of
the translog by checking to see if parameter estimates are
consistent with monotonicity and convexity of the indifference
surfaces at each sample point. We found that the indirect
translog performs better when applied to data sets found by
nonparametric analysis to be consistent with utility maximization. The performance of the direct translog was generally
poor.
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I. Introduction

A fundamental problem associated with empirical
demand studies is the concept of the Hicks representative consumer and utility maximization (Phlips (1983)).
In other words, can the data be rationalized by any

well-behaved utility function?' Swofford and Whitney

'Earlier demand studies used functional forms which satisfied
the theoretical restrictions implied by the theory of demand
but were themselves highly restrictive. For example, the linear
expenditure system meets all theoretical restrictions for a system of demand equations but imposes additive utility. For a
discussion of this and other functional forms for demand
systems, see Intriligator (1978).

